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IS THE BIBLE FICTION?1
Stefan Goltzberg
The aim of this paper is to show that the supposed close connection between 
fiction and false discourse is in fact not strong at all. In wondering whether 
the Bible is fiction, people quite often tend to think that if you say it is fiction, 
you imply it is false. In order to argue for our conclusion, Freud’s notion of 
illusion is analyzed, as well as work by Spinoza and Searle. From the latter, 
the pragmatic perspective of fiction is borrowed: contrary to the semantic per-
spective, the pragmatic perspective is independent of the semantic notions 
of truth and falsity. With the aid of this perspective, the connection between 
being fiction and falsity is called into question.
This essay addresses the question “Is the Bible fiction?” Its purpose is not 
to offer a new answer to this famous problem, but rather to cast light on 
the implications of this question and on its meaning.2 The qualification 
of a text as fictional sounds like saying that the text in question is, in one 
sense or another, false: “The word ‘fiction’ appears to be not infrequently 
used in such a way as at least to imply falsehood.”3 And yet, it is our claim 
that the question of whether the Bible is fiction is not, in itself, linked to 
the question of whether the Bible is true or false. Our purpose is to detach 
the notion of fiction from that of truth or falsity.
A disclaimer and a remark are called for here. First, the disclaimer. The 
Bible is to be understood here in a legal sense; it is as a legal text that Jews 
consider the Bible. It is also as a legal text that Muslims consider the Quran. 
Christians, however, do not approach the Bible as a legal text. Of course, 
in ancient legal systems, the legal material and the non-legal material co-
habit and therefore there is nothing special about the fact that the Bible, 
even from a Jewish angle, is full of non-legal material too. Thus, “Bible” 
could, for the sake of the argument, be replaced by any legally binding text. 
The question is: could a sacred text be fiction? More precisely: could a text 
1Editor’s note: This essay was the winner of the initial Essay Prize offered by the Associa-
tion for the Philosophy of Judaism. Faith and Philosophy agreed to publish the winner of the 
prize, subject to the approval of the journal’s referees and editor.
2I am grateful to the Wiener-Anspach Foundation, which enabled me to conduct my 
research at the University of Cambridge. I am also grateful to the Association for the Phi-
losophy of Judaism for the Essay Prize they organized, especially to Sam Lebens and Dani 
Rabinowitz. I also want to thank Jerrold Levinson, Jennifer Nigri, Eliana Rahmani, Reuven 
Shirazi, and the anonymous reviewers who substantially contributed to improve this text.
3James O. Urmson, “Fiction,” American Philosophical Quartely 13:2 (1976), 153.
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that is still considered sacred be seen as fiction? It is indeed less urgent to 
wonder whether formerly sacred texts of the Egyptians, the Incas and the 
like are today fictional, as it would not affect many people to say they are.
Now for my inaugural remark. Fiction can, at face value, be analyzed 
from two perspectives: that of the author and that of the reader.4 You can 
emit, write, or promulgate a text as fiction, and you can receive, read, or 
understand a text as fiction. Ideally, it seems, a piece of fiction is a text 
conceived of as fictional both by its author and by its readers. What con-
cerns us is the question of the Bible being or not being fiction. Obviously 
it is impractical to ask the author of the Bible what his—or her, or their— 
intention was. Whether one takes the religious or the historical approach, 
one does not have access to the author’s intention, even indirectly— 
unless, of course, one is a prophet or a clairvoyant, which I certainly do not 
claim to be. The philosopher John R. Searle holds that the status of fiction 
is determined by the author’s intention. But it is also possible to wonder to 
what extent a text might be taken as fiction, independently of the author’s 
intention; or better—in ignorance of his intention. Our question, therefore, 
will be this: Is the Bible to be taken as fiction? What are the consequences 
regarding the truth-value of the text when taken as fiction?
My plan is three-fold. Firstly, a concept close to fiction is analyzed: il-
lusion, particularly as understood by Freud. Secondly, Searle’s definition 
of fiction is assessed. Thirdly, Spinoza’s claim about the Bible’s verity is 
recalled, and hopefully defeated, with the help of Halbertal’s account of 
canonization.
1.
Although Freud’s notion of illusion is fairly well known, it is still ap-
propriate to analyze it in contrast with the notion of fiction. Admittedly, 
illusion is not fiction. But the concepts are akin in many ways. One of their 
commonalities is that these concepts share some antonyms. The antithesis 
of fiction and illusion is sometimes thought to be truth, facts, or reality. 
Fiction and illusion are qualifications that can be used to disqualify a posi-
tion. If I say that your talk is based on fiction, you may feel that I am, at the 
very least, not sympathetic to your view. It sounds as if I am suggesting 
that your talk was false, or at least groundless. And if I say that your com-
prehension of a certain state of affairs stems from an illusion, I suggest 
that your speech is at best misguided, if not actually misleading. This kin-
ship between fiction and illusion is foregrounded in Freud’s text. He states 
that religious doctrines—thus comprising the Bible—“are called ‘fictions,’ 
but from a variety of practical motives we are led to behave ‘as if’ we 
believed in these fictions.”5 The Bible, according to Freud, is fiction. One 
4Jean-Marie Schaeffer, Pourquoi la fiction? (Paris: Seuil, 1999); Lorenzo Menoud, Qu’est-ce 
que la fiction? (Paris: Vrin, 2005).
5Freud adds: “I think that the claim of the philosophy of ‘As If’ is such as only a philoso-
pher could make.” Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New 
York: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), 48–49.
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might think this implies Freud’s commitment to the falsity of the Bible, i.e., 
to the idea that belief in the Bible is, in itself, a mistake. However, I do not 
think that Freud says this. To demonstrate this, I quote a lengthy passage 
by Freud on this issue:
An illusion is not the same as an error, it is indeed not necessarily an error. 
Aristotle’s belief that vermin are evolved out of dung, to which ignorant 
people still cling, was an error; so was the belief of a former generation of 
doctors that tabes dorsalis was the result of sexual excess. It would be im-
proper to call these errors illusions. On the other hand, it was an illusion on 
the part of Columbus that he had discovered a new sea-route to India. The 
part played by his wish in this error is very clear.6
Freud clearly distinguishes here between illusion and error. He holds that 
although an illusion may very well be an error, like Columbus’s belief in 
the sea-route to India, it does not have to be one. Conversely, an error 
is not necessarily an illusion: Aristotle was wrong in this particular bio-
logical point, but not due to an illusion. Illusion and error may happen 
to overlap, but they are not interchangeable concepts. The specific trait of 
an illusion that separates it from an error is the part played by the wishes 
of the person who entertains an illusory belief. It is not that he lacks evi-
dence; rather, however convincing his evidence, and whether or not he 
possesses any evidence, he is under an illusion because of a drive or wish. 
Illusion literally is wishful thinking.
Let us now revert to Freud’s explanation:
It is characteristic of the illusion that it is derived from men’s wishes; in this 
respect it approaches the psychiatric delusion, but it is to be distinguished 
from this, quite apart from the more complicated structure of the latter. In 
the delusion we emphasize as essential the conflict with reality; the illusion 
need not be necessarily false, that is to say, unrealizable or incompatible 
with reality. For instance, a poor girl may have an illusion that a prince will 
come and fetch her home. It is possible; some such cases have occurred. 
That the Messiah will come and found a golden age is much less probable; 
according to one’s personal attitude one will classify this belief as an illusion 
or as analogous to delusion.7
Freud introduces here a distinction between illusion, derived from men’s 
wishes, and delusion. The latter is essentially in conflict with reality. Illu-
sion, in contrast to delusion, is not necessarily false. On the other hand, a 
delusion is false by definition. This poor girl whom Freud uses as an ex-
ample of entertaining an illusion is not likely to see her dream come true, 
but this eventuality is not excluded. Interestingly, the following example 
chosen by Freud is that of the Messiah. One might have thought that Freud 
would consider it a typical case of delusion. Instead, he makes it clear that 
the doctrine of the Messiah qualifies as illusion or delusion depending 
on personal attitude. This means that a single belief may be considered 
6Ibid., 52–53.
7Ibid., 53. 
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as either illusion or delusion depending on one’s personal, philosophical, 
and religious worldview. When it comes to religious doctrines, including 
those in the Bible, Freud’s position is unequivocal: such doctrines are illu-
sions, meaning that we lack evidence for them, but it is neither excluded 
nor entirely improbable that they are true.8
Thus we can call a belief an illusion when wish-fulfilment is a prominent 
factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the 
illusion itself does.9
Freud’s definition of an illusion, which includes religious doctrines, thus 
makes illusoriness independent of the question of the truth-value of the 
illusory belief.
2.
From Freud’s rather surprising view of illusion we turn to the shift effected 
by Searle in recent theories of fiction. Until Searle, most conceptions of 
fiction defined it as a type of false discourse. This accounts for the bad 
connotation of the notion of fiction: that is, when it is said that someone’s 
utterance is mere fiction it is meant (and, to a large extent, still means) 
that it is false, or at least seriously lacks evidence. Searle’s definition of fic-
tion shifts the attention from the semantic to the pragmatic point of view. 
Whereas a semantic definition implies the falsity of the fiction, a pragmatic 
approach does not, focusing instead on what is done with a text that quali-
fies as fiction (rather than on the text’s propositional content).
According to Searle, fictional discourse is to be distinguished from non-
literal and indirect speech acts. A nonliteral speech act is metaphorical and 
the opposite of a direct speech act is an indirect one. A nonliteral state-
ment is, for example, Richard is a lion, assuming you mean that Richard is 
courageous and happens not to be a lion—otherwise it would scarcely be 
a metaphorical statement. An example of an indirect speech act is when 
I ask you if you could reach the salt, and thereby I indirectly ask you to 
pass me the salt. I do not actually need to know if you have the capacity of 
so doing—which I presume you have—but I only tell you (indirectly and 
thus presumably kindly) to pass me the salt. The real speech act is not a 
question about a state of affairs but rather a directive speech act, i.e., based 
on a direction of fit that is world-to-word: I ask from you that you modify 
the world so that it fits the words of the proposition “I have the salt.”
Therefore, it is clear that fiction is neither necessarily nonliteral nor 
indirect. Indeed, a fictional discourse could very well be literal or direct, 
as indeed most fictions are. In addition, although literal is the opposite of 
metaphorical and indirect is the opposite of direct, the word “fiction” has 
8Religious doctrines, says Freud, “are all illusions, they do not admit of proof, and no one 
can be compelled to consider them as true or to believe them. Some of them are so improb-
able . . . that we may compare them . . . to delusions” (ibid., 54). The distinction between 
illusion and delusion is thus one of degree, not of nature.
9Ibid., 54.
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no contrary. This is why bookshops, libraries and publishers, in labeling 
the sorts of books in philosophy, history, psychology and the like, resort 
to the category of “nonfiction”! A text may be fictional without being 
metaphorical or indirect, in the same way that a metaphorical or indirect 
speech act may be nonfictional. In order not to use the clumsy expression 
“nonfictional,” Searle calls the opposite of fiction a serious text. The latter 
expression is to be understood here only as a technical term to refer to the 
opposite of fiction, whether or not the nonfictional text under analysis is 
actually serious in the ordinary sense of “serious.”
Fictional discourse is explained by Searle in terms of pretense. But there 
are at least two sorts of pretense,10 depending on whether the interlocutor 
is aware of the speaker’s pretending. If the interlocutor is not aware of the 
speaker’s pretending to describe facts, the pretense is deceptive. It is close 
to lying, misleading or deceiving, depending on whether the speaker is 
aware that his interlocutor is not aware of the speaker’s pretense. Searle 
states that “fiction is much more sophisticated than lying.”11 Indeed, fic-
tion comes into the picture when the pretense is overt, manifest: both the 
speaker and the interlocutor are aware that fiction is being performed, and 
each knows that the other one is aware of this.
Who decides that fiction is taking place? From the outset, it seems that 
both the speaker and the listener need to agree on the fact that the first 
will pretend to describe facts and the second will pretend to believe the 
first.12 This notwithstanding, Searle contends that the discourse qualifies 
as fiction depending on the intention of the speaker alone. Searle writes 
that “pretend is an intentional verb . . . the identifying criterion for whether 
or not a text is a work of fiction must of necessity lie in the illocutionary 
intention of the author.”13 According to this approach, a discourse quali-
fies as fiction if and only if the producer of the discourse intends it to be a 
fiction. Indeed, according to Searle, and to Urmson,14 there is no linguistic 
trait that enables the reader to know the text is a fiction.
[What] makes fiction possible, I suggest, is a set of extralinguistic, nonseman-
tic conventions that break the connection between words and the world.15
Some philosophers have called into question Searle’s decision to exclude 
the possibility of identifying linguistic and semantic features that determine 
10Austin and Walton distinguish pretend and make believe. See John L. Austin, Philo-
sophical Papers (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), chap. 11, and Kendall 
L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
11John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning (Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 67.
12Currie rejects this approach. See Gregory Currie, “What is Fiction?,” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 43:4 (1985), 385–392.
13Searle, Expression and Meaning, 65.
14Urmson, “Fiction,” 157.
15Searle, Expression and Meaning, 66.
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whether a discourse is fiction.16 But according to Searle, it is the speaker, not 
the interlocutor—or the writer, not the reader—that makes the discourse a 
piece of fiction:
[W]hether or not a work is literature is for the readers to decide, whether or 
not it is fiction is for the author to decide.17
Returning to the question of whether the Bible is fiction, and whether it 
is to be taken as fiction, it is clear that we do not know what the intention 
of its author(s) was; indeed, how could we know? To be sure, it is already 
difficult when it comes to the intention of a modern writer. How could we 
possibly know about the Bible’s author(s)? It is impossible, although much 
scholarly research is devoted on this question. From a strictly Searlean 
point of view, we cannot know whether it was meant to be read as fiction 
or not. Yet the second perspective, the reader’s perspective, is interesting 
in its own right: is the Bible to be taken as if its author had the intention of 
transmitting a fiction? I think the following two points in Searle’s text are 
independent of one another: (1) a text qualifies as fiction depending on the 
author’s intention; (2) fiction is taken to be non-deceptive and mutually 
manifest pretense.18 The latter point holds even if the first point is called 
into question. In fact, I do not call the first one into question so much as 
I contend that in some circumstances, namely when the intention of the 
author is unknown, it is reasonable to ascertain how the reader perceives 
the text in order to classify it as fiction or not. In any event, its readers may 
treat the Bible as fiction. What then is its truth-value? Is it false in virtue 
of being fiction? A semantic definition would give an affirmative answer, 
whereas the Searlean stance, the pragmatic definition of fiction (fiction 
is a mutual pretense, independent of the truth-value), says no, or more 
precisely, not necessarily.
Again, defined pragmatically, fiction is disconnected from the question 
of truth or falsity. A speech will be a fiction depending on whether its 
author intends it to be a fiction. According to us, in cases where the author 
is not reachable by e-mail or otherwise, the text may qualify as fictional 
depending on the readers’ attitude towards it. In either case, fiction is in-
dependent of truth-value.
3.
My third concern is Spinoza’s view of the Bible. He explicitly states that 
the text is not to be taken as true by its readers from the outset but they 
should rather inquire and check whether the Bible is true or not. In fact, 
says Spinoza, its readers tend to beg the question and suppose that it is 
true come what may.
16Gérard Genette, Fiction et diction (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
17Searle, Expression and Meaning, 59. 
18The addition of “taken to be” makes it possible to speak about the reader’s behaving as 
if the text was itself written by a writer willing it to be taken to be a fiction. Otherwise, as an 
anonymous referee mentioned, the two points would be contradictory.
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The very vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly attests, 
that their belief in the Bible is a formal assent rather than a living faith: 
and the fact is made still more apparent by their laying down beforehand, 
as a foundation for the study and true interpretation of Scripture, the prin-
ciple that it is in every passage true and divine. Such a doctrine should 
be reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the 
Sacred Books (which would teach it much better, for they stand in need 
of no human factions), and not be set up on the threshold, as it were, of 
inquiry.19
Spinoza does not in this very excerpt say that the Bible is false. He rather 
denounces the hermeneutical approach that presupposes that the text is 
true, which should rather be the conclusion of a thorough analysis. One 
needs here to distinguish two things that are not clearly separated in 
Spinoza’s text: to presume and to presuppose. It is normal to presume that 
a text is true, until proof to the contrary is given. It is called the principle 
of charity. Now what happens if the text turns out to be false? The pre-
sumption is defeated, or rebutted, as a lawyer might put it. Indeed, legal 
presumptions are either rebuttable or irrebuttable. In the latter case you 
presuppose (and not only suppose) that the text is true and the proof to the 
contrary is not admissible: the proof is said to be illegal. A presupposi-
tion is no presumption. It is an implicit message that cannot possibly be 
denied. For example, if I say “I don’t smoke anymore,” I say that I do not 
smoke and I presuppose that I did smoke in the past. It is irrational—or 
humoristic—to utter this sentence if I never smoked. Spinoza criticizes 
some readers of the Bible because they presuppose the truth of the text, 
rather than merely presume it using a rebuttable presumption. One could 
also put it differently: they make an irrebuttable presumption that the 
Bible is true, so a proof to the contrary will never arise, or if it does, will 
simply be disregarded.
Is Spinoza’s critique relevant? It would be the case if the reader took 
the Bible as an assertion or a set of assertions. Then, the discourse would 
be either true or false, and since “no statement is immune to revision,” 
as Quine puts it,20 the Bible could possibly be disproved. But the claim 
that the Bible asserts anything at all is debatable, from at least two points 
of view.
First, if you accept that the Bible is fiction, as Spinoza seems to suggest, 
then it is not made up of assertions. According to Searle, the statements 
contained in a fiction are like assertions, but are not assertions as such. Nor 
are these another speech act. Fictional statements are rather pretended 
assertions. Spinoza’s claim could perhaps be relevant if the Bible was 
considered as nonfictional, i.e., (in Searle’s terminology) as serious. Now 
if Genette is right, it makes Spinoza’s claim even less relevant. Indeed, 
Genette summarizes Searle’s view in the following claims: (1) fiction is 
19Joseph Ratner, The Philosophy of Spinoza (El Paso, TX: El Paso Norte Press, 2010), 41.
20Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press, [1953] 1980), 43.
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a pretended assertion and (2) fiction is not another speech act. Genette 
wants to untie those claims.21 He accepts the first one, because otherwise, 
there would be no distinction between serious and fictional discourse. But 
he calls into question the second claim. Moreover, he denies that (1) im-
plies (2): it is not the case that, because fictional discourse is a pretended 
assertion, it cannot at the same time be another speech act.22 He moves on 
to the idea that fictional discourse is an indirect directive speech act. For 
example, when I say: “It is cold” (let us say I already got the salt and I’m 
still willing to socialize), I am uttering such an indirect directive speech 
act. I apparently describe a state of affairs, which is an assertion, but in 
fact my point is that I would like you to close the window. I would like 
you to understand that my assertion aims not at describing the world—
who cares if it is cold?—but, in this case, at making you act in a certain 
fashion, namely by closing the window. Of course, you can understand 
my indirect speech act only against a common background and many 
shared presuppositions. In the case of fiction, Genette characterizes 
it as an invitation to enter the fictional world: it is therefore a directive 
speech act.23
Secondly, there is another reason why Spinoza’s critique does not hold. 
This reason is to be explained from a jurisprudential point of view, i.e., 
from the standpoint of legal philosophy. There indeed exists another way 
of engaging with the Bible; other than as a descriptive text that may be true 
or false and, above all, that may be confirmed or disconfirmed by appeal 
to facts. One needs to distinguish an approach to the Bible based on faith 
from one that is based on law. Roughly speaking, Leo Strauss distinguishes 
Christianity—being based on faith—from Islam and Judaism, both based 
on law.24 It does not mean that there is no faith in Judaism and Islam or no 
law in Christianity, but that the structural foundation of Judaism and Islam 
is a legal system, however pluralist, while the foundation of Christianity is 
faith in God, even if at times Christianity may de facto be shaped by law. 
Let us for the sake of the argument put Islam aside, as the Bible is not as 
such part of their Scriptures, although what we say here about Judaism 
should apply mutatis mutandis to Islam. Judaism and Christianity differ 
in that the latter does not take the Bible as a source of law but rather as 
21Genette, Fiction et diction, 124.
22This point was also made by Currie.
23Genette, Fiction et diction,127.
24“One has to start from the difference between Judaism and Islam on the one hand and 
Christianity on the other. For the Jew and the Moslem, religion is primarily not, as it is for 
the Christian, a faith formulated in dogmas, but a law, a code of divine origin. Accordingly, 
the religious science, the sacra doctrina, is not dogmatic theology, theologia revelata, but the 
science of the law, halaka or fiqh. The science of the law thus understood has much less in 
common with philosophy than has dogmatic theology.” Leo Strauss, “How to Begin to Study 
Medieval Philosophy,” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: Essays and Lectures by 
Leo Strauss, selected and introduced by Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1989), 221. This quotation is from a lecture Strauss delivered in 1944.
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a source of ethics. Judaism, on the other hand, conceives of the Bible—at 
least of the Pentateuch—as primarily a source of law.
This approach is legal and not merely ethical. What is required is to 
understand what is demanded from Jews and human beings in general, 
in terms of laws and ethics, and not only in terms of ethics. Let us examine 
this question first not from a Jewish perspective but from a general legal 
perspective. Law is to be conceived of as a game with several rules that 
are constitutive in the sense that if you break them you are not playing the 
game anymore. In this sense, the constitutive rules are necessary condi-
tions for you to play the game. One of these rules is the axiom that the text 
of the law is right, complete, and consistent. Of course, this rule may be 
applied differently depending on how many sources of law you rely upon. 
But if one of the sources is considered as virtually sacred, so to speak, like 
the code civil in France or like the Torah for the Jews, then the rule fully 
applies: the main source of law—whether religious or secular—cannot 
be declared false, unjust, incomplete or contradictory, lest you break the 
constitutive law and dismiss the very legal system itself. You would then 
have renounced playing the game. The judge, typically, is responsible for 
obeying the rule. He does not have the right to appeal to lacunae, contra-
dictions, or insufficiencies of the law. Again, it is not that the law—here 
the Torah—is complete, which would be an assertion that can turn out to 
be true or false, but the judge is asked not to appeal to its incompleteness 
to justify a judicial decision. He does not have the right to appeal to such 
shortcomings.
This rule—that the law is true, just, complete, and coherent—can be 
explained in various ways. The rule is explicitly expressed in the article 4 
of the French code civil:
A judge who refuses to give judgment on the pretext of legislation being 
silent, obscure or insufficient, may be prosecuted for being guilty of a denial 
of justice.
In other words, it is forbidden for the judge to refuse to give judgment 
just because the law is, or seems to be, incomplete. I mentioned earlier 
that it was a constitutive rule. You could also call it a general principle, a 
legal fiction, or a presumption. This rule, being constitutive, is stronger 
than a principle, since by definition principles, as opposed to rules, can be 
overturned. So I prefer not to keep the label “principle” to describe a rule 
that admits of no overturning. This leaves us with fiction or presumption. 
It can in fact be defined either as fiction, as an irrebuttable presumption, 
or as a rule. If it is a rule, it means that this rule prevents the judge from 
appealing to the shortcomings of the law. It could also be defined as an 
irrebuttable presumption which, by definition, cannot be rebutted. It 
could, finally, be taken as a fiction. The distinction between fiction and 
irrebuttable presumption is not easy to pin down. Perelman, the major phi-
losopher of the Brussels School of Jurisprudence, says that the difference 
is that a legal fiction contradicts the legal reality, whereas an irrebuttable 
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presumption may happen to be true.25 The problem here is that Perelman 
defines the fiction in semantic terms—it contradicts the legal reality, i.e., 
it is false—whereas irrebuttable presumptions may happen to be true. In 
other words, Perelman’s definition of fiction is not sustainable because it 
is still semantic. So for us, that rule can still be described as either irrebut-
table presumption or fiction (defined pragmatically, pace Perelman). Let us 
now come back to Spinoza.
Spinoza criticized the readers of the Bible for begging the question. To 
be sure, circular reasoning is prohibited and should in no way be accepted. 
But is this approach circular? I think not. It would be circular if I wanted (1) 
to show that the text is true while (2) presupposing that it is true. You can 
replace “true” by “complete,” “consistent,” “just,” or any other adjective. 
The approach we are thinking about, the legal approach, is not circular. It 
does indeed presuppose that the text—here the Bible—is just, true, com-
plete, and consistent, but it does not demonstrate it. It rather reads the 
text bearing in mind that the text is perfect, whatever is written in it. The 
purpose of the reader is not to demonstrate its truth. If the reader—from 
the legal perspective—pauses for a moment and wonders whether the text 
he has been scrutinizing is indeed perfect, he has, so to speak, left the 
game. He is daydreaming at best; playing another game at worst. It looks 
as if Spinoza criticizes the reader—for the sake of the exercise, let us focus 
on the legal Jewish point of view, even though Spinoza was disparaging 
other people—for being circular rather than playing the descriptive game. 
But the Jewish legal point of view is neither circular nor descriptive; it is 
dependent upon a rule that forbids raising the questions of truth, justice, 
completeness, and consistency, all of which are presupposed. Not only 
does Spinoza’s critique miss the point but it would be a mistake for the 
reader—from the legal Jewish perspective—to follow Spinoza’s recom-
mendation and call into question the perfection of the text.
Halbertal has shown that when a text is being canonized, this is what 
happens: the text that passes the test of the controversies regarding its 
being perfect and divinely inspired is simply declared perfect. It is not 
retained in the canon because it is perfect; on the contrary, it is considered 
perfect because it has been canonized. This of course does not mean that 
the canonization was arbitrary or lacking in good reasons.26
We have shown that the question “Is the Bible fiction?” is not a ques-
tion about the truth of the Bible. There are four possible combinations 
regarding the truth and the fictional status of the Bible:
(1) The Bible is true and is not fiction;
(2) The Bible is false and is not fiction;
25See Chaïm Perelman, Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique (Paris: Dalloz, [1976] 1979), 
and Stefan Goltzberg, Perelman. Argumentation juridique (Paris: Michalon, 2013), 78–80.
26Moshe Halbertal, The People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority (Cambridge & 
London: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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(3) The Bible is true and is fiction;
(4) The Bible is false and is fiction.
This presentation is rather bizarre because usually when you speak about 
fiction, you don’t really leave the question of truth open; instead you close 
it without raising it, and therefore without answering it. The answer does 
not go without saying; rather, the question goes without being raised. 
What is the utility of this question? Is it of importance? Urmson said: “I 
am not sure importance is important”—which leads one to wonder what 
might be more important than importance—but then goes on to say: 
“Truth is.” True enough! However, in the case of the Bible, truth may be 
of importance, but not within the legal (including the Jewish) approach. 
Not only is it not important, but it is inadmissible to ask, in the middle of 
a discussion about the meaning of a verse, whether the Bible is true or false. 
It would be like asking, in the middle of a game of chess, whether it is in 
fact true that White moves first. You cannot possibly raise that question, 
although you may answer it. The fact that mid-game you may answer the 
question of the truth of a primordial rule of chess does not mean that it is 
an admissible question. The proof is that if you don’t answer, you are not 
wrong, as a chess player. As a teacher, when you pretend to play, you may 
explain the rules, but during the game of chess, there is no such move as 
“telling the ultimate truth about the rules of chess,” since you may play 
chess and keep silent.
The Bible is in this respect comparable to the game of chess. Before you 
start the game, you may say many things and it does not really matter 
what exactly is said. You may think, for instance, that Black should move 
first. Still, when you start playing, you allow White to start. You may, from 
a legal Jewish point of view, call the Bible into question (the equivalent of 
calling the rules of chess into question)—purely academically and only 
temporarily—in order to discover the meaning of a particular passage; by 
the end of the argument, however, you must have resolved the problem. 
Perhaps the chess problem is a better metaphor for the study of the Bible. In 
the latter case there is no controversy about the law but only about which 
verse is the source of the law. Finding the right verse is like finding the 
solution of a chess problem. Of course, when you disagree on the law, you 
have a more complicated situation: you simultaneously disagree on the 
law and on the interpretation of the verses—since from a legal (halakhic) 
point of view, each law should be explained by one element of the text 
and this element is not supposed to explain more than one law. What mat-
ters here is that, however complicated the problem is, the interlocutors 
do presuppose that the text of law, the Torah, is true, just, complete, and 
consistent. In this sense, whether the Bible is fiction or not is not a good 
question; it is even an inappropriate question, since it prevents you from 
resolving the real problem.
The question that was raised is thus not interesting. However, it has 
been discussed here because it has long vexed commentators. The solution 
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that I offer is not as such an answer to the question, but rather an explana-
tion of the impropriety of the question. I can only hope that the explanation 
was not as uninteresting as the question.
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